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Executive summary 
 Attitudes to immigration in France, as in most European countries, are highly stable and are in 
fact becoming slightly more favourable. 
 France has relatively negative attitudes to immigration when compared with other western 
European countries. 
 However, the French see immigration as a relatively unimportant issue affecting their country, 
considerably less so than other western European electorates. 
 The recent uptick in perceived importance of immigration in almost all western European 
countries has been far less pronounced in France. 
 The French see cultural assimilation as more important when deciding who should be allowed to 
immigrate than economic self-sufficiency, relative to other western European states. 
 Attitudes to immigration can be powerfully predicted by fundamental psychological traits, with 
individuals displaying openness and excitability more drawn towards pro-immigration positions 
and those displaying conscientiousness and concern over safety more drawn towards anti-
immigration positions. 
 Attitudes to immigration are also powerfully predicted by broader political attitudes, such as left-
right self-placement, desire for egalitarianism and desire for a strong government to secure 
safety. Also, individuals who are more sceptical of the motives of politicians tend to be more 
opposed to immigration. 
 Individuals living in more diverse regions and who have more ethnically diverse friends tend to 
hold more pro-immigration positions. 
 With the above variables, we can explain around 40 per cent of variation in attitudes to 
immigration. 
 Surprisingly, with the above variables taken into account, we find no direct effect of university 
education, parental education, nationalism, cultural supremacism, interest in politics or having 
lived abroad on attitudes to immigration. 
 Attitudes to immigration in France, it seems, are the result of deep-lying psychological 
differences within the electorate and are unlikely to be easily changed by exposure to new 
information or political campaigns.  
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The background to immigration and the French election 
Immigration has been a key topic of the 2017 French electoral debate and of French political discourse 
in general in the past decade. While this is common to many European countries, in France it has been 
deeply intertwined with issues of identity. The debate on immigration in France is rooted historically 
in its post-colonial past and in its traditional assimilationist policies. Indeed, these policies were one of 
the main ideological underpinnings of French colonial rule; the idea being that by adopting French 
values and cultures citizens of the colonies would be considered French. This focus on assimilation 
was still very much present in the policies of post-colonial France during the 1960s and 1970s 
(Lacroix, 2015). From the mid-1980s onwards, however, a more multiculturalist policy that 
encouraged immigrants to keep their own traditions became more predominant (Zappi, 2003). This, 
however, went hand-in-hand with increasingly closed borders policy and with de-industrialization that 
meant that fewer immigrants were needed as workers in factories. 
From 2000 onwards, under the pressure of FN and the identitarian right, there has been a revamp of 
assimilationist policies. In 2003, an “integration contract” was introduced with which migrants were 
required to abide by French values and norms. In 2011 “citizenship tests” were required for 
immigrants hoping to get French nationality while integration and anti-discrimination policies were 
gradually eliminated. Similarly, throughout the 2000s French political discourse has strongly focused 
on secularism as a key component of the French republican identity, which the radical right argues is 
threatened by religious immigrants’ values (mainly, Muslims). The heated debate on headscarves and 
its formal ban in schools in 2004 is as an example of this assimilationist reaction. In 2011 Burqas were 
banned in public places and in summer of 2016 the discussion on ‘Burkinis’ was widely debated in the 
media. 
The idea that a growing and increasingly diverse set of immigrants potentially fatally threatens 
France’s identity is one of the key narratives proposed by Marine Le Pen’s Front National. Le Pen has 
presented herself as the defender of the French nation and her references to immigration are mainly 
identitarian. The slogan of the Front National’s campaign “au nom du peuple” reflects FN’s strategy of 
trying to embody both the interests and values of the French people that she conceived as a 
homogeneous “heartland” (Taggart, 2000). This heartland is portrayed as ordinary French people that 
are eager to defend what they believe are quintessential French values. The FN juxtapositions the idea 
of the ‘people’ (as an in-group) and immigrants (as an out-group) who are considered ‘unwilling to 
adapt’ and pose a threat to the French traditional way of life. This heartland is defined very much in 
identitarian terms as values and traditions (e.g. stressing France’s traditional secularism versus a 
supposed Islamisation of French society). Economic considerations (such as competition with 
immigrants over jobs) or references to the recent refugee crisis have been part of the political 
discourse of this campaign, however, less so than in other countries. By 2017, French attitudes to 
immigration are largely addressed through allusions to the French Republican identity and 
multiculturalism.  
French attitudes to immigration in the European context 
To investigate actual French attitudes to immigration, we start by comparing aggregate favourability to 
immigration in France with that in other European countries. French attitudes to immigration lay 
somewhere around the average of European attitudes. Around 60 per cent of Frenchmen have negative 
attitudes towards non-EU immigrants while just over 20 per cent have negative attitudes towards EU 
immigrants, making France, amongst Western European countries, relatively positive towards 
European immigrants though relatively opposed to non-EU immigration (Eurobarometer, 2016). 
Indeed, in Western Germany, this number is ten percentage points lower.  
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Figure 1. Negative (very negative and fairly negative) attitudes towards immigration, 
percentages (Eurobarometer 2016) 
 
In general, with respect to other European countries, France positions itself as more welcoming than 
Eastern European countries but the French seem more concerned about the characteristics migrants 
have than fellow Western European countries. A distinctive trait of French attitudes seems to be the 
relatively lower concern for immigrants work skills. However, French respondents overwhelmingly 
believe that it is very important that immigrants speak French (74%). This seems to be in line with the 
importance that has been traditionally placed in France on cultural assimilation. 
Figure 2: French attitudes to the requirements of immigrants (ESS 2014) 
Percentage of population that believe it is very 
important that immigrants speak the country's 
official language (ESS 2014) 
Percentage of population that believe it is very 
important that immigrants have work skills 
needed in the country (ESS 2014) 
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As shown in Figure 3, French attitudes to immigration across time, like those of most European 
countries, have changed little in the twenty-first century, displaying a remarkable degree of stability. 
This suggests that attitudes are largely uninfluenced by contingent events. In particular, the relative 
position of European countries with respect to attitudes seems to be stable; suggesting a powerful role 
of country-specific histories, cultures and social structures, all of which are stubborn. This stability 
seems to dismiss portrayals of an anti-immigration tide in Europe; if anything, overall, attitudes have 
become slightly positive. Given the rise of anti-immigration parties throughout Europe, and in France 
in particular, this stability in attitudes seems rather surprising, possibly suggesting that although they 
remain unchanged, anti-immigration attitudes have been increasingly activated politically. Although 
attitudes have not changed, it is likely, therefore, that the salience of the immigration issue has 
increased for some who were always opposed to immigration in the abstract (Davis and Deole, 2015; 
Hatton, forthcoming).  
Figure 3. Mean evaluation of whether immigrants make the country a better or worse place to 
live (0 = worse to 10 = better) (source: ESS 2014) 
 
Indeed, when considering people’s evaluation of the most important issue in their country, the 
percentage of those pointing to immigration has risen in the years between 2002 and 2016 
(Eurobarometer). However, its increase was not constant – it seems to decrease in most countries 
between 2002 and 2008 and then rises sharply from 2012 to 2016. This might partially be attributed to 
the steep rise in immigration to Europe with the ‘refugee crisis’. Most notably, in France the 
proportion of the electorate choosing immigration as one of the most important issues affecting the 
country is considerably lower than other western European countries through the period, despite a 
minor uptick between 2014 and 2016. 
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Figure 4: Percentage of the population that picked immigration as the most important issue 
facing their country between 2002 and 2016 (Eurobarometer) 
 
Turning to France in particular, remarkably little change can be seen between attitudes from 2002 and 
2014, as shown in Figure 4. This is true both for the perceived effects of immigration in France (in 
cultural and economic terms) and for French attitudes towards different types of immigrants. 
Nonetheless, there is a slight differentiation of attitudes towards different types of immigrants; this 
may be due to the increased policy relevance of immigration, which could lead to slightly more 
nuanced attitudes. 
Figure 5: Variance in attitudes towards different effects of immigrants and types of immigrant 
in France, 2002-2014 
Perceived effects of immigration in France 
between 2002 and 2014 (ESS) 
French attitudes to type of immigrant between 
2002 and 2014 (ESS) 
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Regional variation 
At the regional level attitudes are more negative in the North East of France, sometimes referred to as 
the country’s rust belt. This is a region often characterised by deindustrialisation, higher 
unemployment and lower wages than elsewhere in France. Also, attitudes are very negative in the 
South-East while, unsurprisingly, the Paris area seems to be the most tolerant. When compared to the 
proportion of foreign-born population in the latest census, there is a positive correlation between 
favourability to immigration and the presence of immigrants.  
Overall, the regional distribution of negative attitudes to immigration mirrors votes obtained by the 
Front National in the first round of the election. Indeed, the Front National was particularly strong in 
the North-Eastern region of Hauts-de-France where the party obtained 31% of the vote share and in 
the South-Eastern region of Provence-Alpes-Cote d’Azur (28.2% of votes) in the first round of the 
2017 Presidential Election. Its vote share was lowest in Ile-de-France and Brittany (12.6% and 15.3% 
of votes respectively), which, particularly in the case of Ile-de-France, are also among the areas in 
which attitudes towards immigrants are more positive. 
Figure 6: Attitudes to immigration and foreign-born population by French region 
Percentage of the population that believe that 
immigrants make France a worse place to live in1 
(ESS 2014) 
Percentage of the population born outside the EU 
(Eurostat 2011 Census) 
  
Explaining variation in attitudes to immigration in France 
There is no shortage of academic studies that examine the causes of attitudes to immigration. As our 
starting point, we draw on the findings of two overviews of the literature (Berg, 2015; Hainmueller 
and Hopkins, 2014) as well as the literature reviews of two recent empirical papers (Rustenbach, 2010; 
Kauffman, 2014). These four articles alone consider around 250 academic studies into variance in 
attitudes to immigration, as well as related phenomena such as attitudes to race and support for radical 
right parties. We very briefly attempt to classify and describe this large number of studies in the 
following text.  
The various explanations for variation in attitudes to migration can be place in four theoretical 
groups: psychological explanations, socialisation explanations, attitudinal explanations, and contextual 
explanations. The first of these groups, psychological variables, sees attitudes to immigration – and, 
indeed, attitudes to broader political phenomena – as a reflection of deep-seated, fundamental (and, 
arguably, fixed and genetic) personality traits and cognitive patterns, as well as the individual’s self-
                                                     
1
 The question asks whether respondents believe that immigrants make the country a better or worse place to live in on a 
scale from 0 (worse) to 10 (better). Here we consider only those that answered 0,1,2 or 3. 
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identity. Early classic works such as Allport (1954) argued that racist attitudes were the result of an 
authoritarian personality type. More recently works such as Lee et al (2001) have found that anti-
immigration attitudes result from valuing obedience to rules and law. Stets and Burke (2000) and 
Fussell (2014) show that such attitudes result from in-group favouritism, one of the five variables 
found in moral foundation theory. Haidt and Graham (2011) show that liberals derive their moral 
views from a strong sense of fairness and caring whereas conservatives draw on their greater 
predisposition towards loyalty, authority and sanctity. Political attitudes have also been shown to 
relate to the ‘Big Five’ personality traits, with greater openness to experience resulting in more liberal 
views whereas greater conscientiousness and emotional stability lead to more conservative views 
(Dennison, 2016). 
Second, the broad range of socialisation effects see attitudes to immigration as the result of various 
life experiences. According to this view, early life experiences such as norm acquisition through 
parents and schooling lead to political attitudes. Later in life, tertiary education and living abroad lead 
to one having a more cosmopolitan outlook and pro-immigration views (e.g. Haubert and Fussell, 
2006; Mayda, 2006; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007; Espenshade and Calhoun, 1993). Having a family 
and children is also supposed to lead to a greater sense of responsibility and therefore risk aversion 
towards large-scale demographic transformation (Jackson et al, 2001). A weaker socio-economic 
position may also lead to greater risk aversion or sense of economic threat and therefore lower 
propensity towards accepting major societal changes or increased economic competition (e.g. 
Espenshade, 1995; Burns and Gimpel, 2000; Espenshade and Hempstead, 1996; Scheve & Slaughter, 
2001). 
Political attitudinal explanations argue that attitudes to immigration are the result of, or at least 
form a part of, prior and broader political ideological positions, as measured through left-right self-
placement, authoritarianism, egalitarianism and nationalism or cultural pride. These arguments find 
support in the finding that in recent years attitudes to immigration in Europe have become more 
correlated with broader political attitudes and subsumed within traditional partisan and ideological 
cleavages (Semyonov, Raijman, and Gorodzeisky, 2006). Anti-establishment and populist attitudes, as 
well as feelings of political alienation, have also been argued to result in greater anti-immigration 
sentiment (though it may be that, inversely, individuals develop these feelings because of antipathy 
towards immigration, which they already hold).  
Finally, contextual variables measuring the individual’s experiences of and perceptions of 
immigration and their community have been shown to have effects on attitudes to immigration. Most 
prominently, the individual’s amount of intimate personal contact with immigrants is theorized to 
increase their favourability towards immigration by increasing their empathy for immigrants (e.g. 
McLaren, 2003; Dixon, 2006; Ha, 2010). Alternatively, less intimate contact, such as increased 
perception of local immigrant presence has been supposed to trigger a feeling of threat in the 
individual and thus greater opposition to immigration (Kauffmann, 2013). Finally, studies (e.g. 
Chandler and Tsai, 2001) show that one’s sense of broader neighbourhood security and safety affects 
their favourability to immigration. 
Despite its breadth, the extant explanations for variation in immigration contain a number of 
weaknesses. First, most explanations, let alone broader groupings, are tested singularly rather than 
comparatively, potentially overestimating the relative importance of each account and ignoring the 
interdependence and causal ordering of respective explanations. Second, the majority of studies use 
research in the United States to make generalised claims, ignoring potential country-specific 
differences. Third, and partially because of the American source of many studies, attitudes to 
immigration and race are often treated as analogous, which in the case of EU migration is less apt. 
Fourth, there are major endogeneity concerns in the literature, particularly regarding issues such as 
self-selection towards contact with immigrants and the issue that attitudes to immigration compose 
broader political attitudes, which have been used to then explain the former. Fifth, the literature is 
overwhelmingly concerned with explaining variance in individual-level variance, rather than 
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aggregate-level variation (in either cross-country or cross-time terms). Finally, studies have focused on 
explaining anti-immigration attitudes, assuming that pro-immigration attitudes are somehow the 
default or ‘correct’ stance, rather than explaining variation in toto. 
We propose to integrate the various explanations of variation in attitudes to immigration by taking 
a ‘funnel of causality’ approach, which has been used previously to explain party choice in elections 
(Hofferbert, 1974). The funnel sees various explanations for a phenomenon as not mutually exclusive 
but instead as interdependent and ordered in terms of proximity in a causal chain. In this case, more 
distal variables are the foundational, if less obvious, causes of variation in attitudes to immigration and 
their effects are felt both directly as well as indirectly via more proximal, variant and acutely impactful 
factors. We create such a funnel of causality based on the key findings of the literature, displayed in 
Figure 7. Although the exact positioning of each grouping is a matter of debate, and of course there is 
a degree of multi-directional covariance, this model goes some way to integrate the extant literature in 
a single theoretical model. 
Figure 7: Funnel of causality of attitudes to immigration 
 
To test the effects of the four groups of explanations for variation in attitudes to immigration in France 
we use data from the 2014 European Social Survey (ESS). The ESS asks over 1,800 representative 
respondents about their attitudes to immigration as well as a range of other attitudes, personality traits, 
and one’s social background. Participants in the ESS are asked to indicate on a scale of 0 to 10 
whether they believe immigrants make France a worse or better place to live, with 10 indicating a 
better place to live.  
We first consider the relationship between psychology and attitudes to immigration by examining 
the correlation between variables that measure individual personality traits and responses to whether 
the respondent believes that immigrants makes France a worse or better place to live. They are also 
asked to indicate on a scale of 1 to 6 how important various aspects and approaches to life are to them, 
which we use to measure their latent personality traits. We do not follow an extant personality trait 
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typology (e.g. the Big Five Personality Traits) but instead examine correlations between the 
personality variables in the ESS and our chosen question on immigration, before proceeding to more 
advanced analytics.
2
 
The resulting correlations are presented in Table 1. Those variables that have statistically 
significant relationships with favourability to immigration (at the 95 per cent level) are in bold. 
Variables are ordered in order of strength of correlation, with those most strongly correlating with 
favourable attitudes to correlation first, followed by those that show little or no correlation, and ending 
with those that show strong negative correlations with favourability to immigration. 
Table 1: Correlations between belief that immigrants make France a better place to live and 
personality traits (source: ESS, 2014) 
It is important … 
Immigrants make France a 
better place to live 
To understand different people 0.183 
To seek adventure and have an exciting life 0.164 
To seek fun and things that give pleasure 0.063 
To try new and different things in life 0.058 
To think new ideas and be creative 0.054 
To have a good time 0.053 
To make my own decisions and be free 0.038 
To help people and care for others’ well-being 0.029 
To be rich, have money and expensive things 0.023 
To be loyal to friends and devote to people close 0.016 
To be successful and people recognize my achievements 0.014 
To show abilities and be admired -0.032 
To be humble and modest, not draw attention -0.059 
To get respect from others -0.075 
To follow tradition and customs -0.117 
To do what is told and follow rules -0.135 
To behave properly -0.147 
To live in secure and safe surroundings -0.227 
Statistically significant correlations in bold (95% level) ; N=1883 
There are clear similarities between those personality traits with statistically significant positive 
correlations with favourability to immigration and those with negative such correlations. The findings 
closely echo previous political psychological academic research, which has repeatedly shown that two 
of the Big Five personality traits – openness and conscientiousness – are respectively associated with 
liberal and conservative political attitudes (Dennison, 2016). Table 1 shows that, on the one hand, 
personality traits that correlate positively with favourability to immigration share a predisposition 
towards openness. This foundational predisposition results in a preference for novelty, disorder and 
                                                     
2
 Of the 21 personality variables in the ESS, we exclude the resultant variables from three questions that we interpret as 
directly measuring political attitudes rather than more latent personality traits. These ask how important the following are 
to the respondent: ‘that government is strong and ensures safety’; ‘that people are treated equally and have equal 
opportunities’; ‘to care for nature and the environment’. We see the first two of these as likely having strong associations 
with attitudes to immigration, but capture political attitudes rather than personality traits (though of course the distinction 
between the two categories is blurred in some cases). We discount as unlikely the possibility that environmental attitudes 
may causally affect immigration attitudes. 
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diversity and sees pleasure-seeking as the primary goal of life and personal feelings as the best guide 
to decision-making. On the other hand, personality traits that correlate negatively with favourability to 
immigration share a predisposition towards conscientiousness. This foundational predisposition results 
in a preference for reliability, order and homogeneity and sees meeting one’s obligations or duty as the 
primary goal of life and social convention as a superior guide to decision-making than personal 
feelings. This relationship is displayed in Figure 8. 
Figure 8: The relationship between psychology and attitudes to immigration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We now proceed to produce a multivariate regression analysis of the effects of various psychological 
variables on favourability to immigration. To produce more comparable results, we standardise the 
psychological variables. In Table 2, we present two regression analyses. The first includes all of the 
above psychological variables that have statistically significant correlations in Table 1. The second 
includes only variables with statistically significant effects after those without such effects were 
incrementally removed. Because of the possibility of multicollinearity, we present Variance Inflation 
Factors from the first regression in Appendix 1. 
  
Pro-immigration Anti-immigration 
Common trait: openness to 
experience 
Preference for: novelty, 
disorder, diversity, pleasure-
seeking, personal feelings 
 
Common trait: 
conscientiousness 
Preference for: reliability, 
order, assurance, 
homogeneity, duty, social 
convention 
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Table 2: Multivariate analysis of the effects of psychological traits on favourability to 
immigration (source: ESS 2014; weighted survey data) 
 Immigrants make France 
a worse or better place to 
live 
 (0-10) 
‘I think it’s important to …’ (1) (2) 
To understand different people 0.49*** 0.485*** 
 (0.080) (0.076) 
To seek adventure and have an exciting life 0.215*** 0.210** 
 (0.080) (0.067) 
To seek fun and things that give pleasure -0.062  
 (0.084)  
To try new and different things in life 0.027  
 (0.078)  
To think new ideas and be creative 0.019  
 (0.075)  
To have a good time 0.036  
 (0.084)  
To be humble and modest, not draw attention -0.045  
 (0.078)  
To get respect from others 0.013  
 (0.075)  
To follow tradition and customs -0.020  
 (0.074)  
To do what is told and follow rules -0.161** -0.150* 
 (0.076) (0.075) 
To behave properly -0.249*** -0.265*** 
 (0.079) (0.075) 
To live in secure and safe surroundings -0.349*** -0.343*** 
 (0.070) (0.065) 
Constant 5.179*** 5.177*** 
 (0.062) (0.062) 
   
Observations 1,816 1,852 
R-squared 0.116 0.113 
Standard errors in parentheses ; *** p<0.05, ** p<0.01, * p<0.001 
All independent variables are standardised 
As we can see in Table 2, all of the variables with statistically significant effects maintain the same 
direction of effect as with the basic correlations in Table 1. In these models only five psychological 
traits have statistically significant effects, however. A preference towards understanding different 
types of people and seeking adventure and excitement both increase favourability towards 
immigration. On the other hand, a preference towards observing rules, behaving in a socially-
prescribed manner and living in security all decrease positivity towards the effects of immigration. 
Psychological traits explain around 11 per cent of variation in attitudes to immigration. The 
explanatory power of these traits is barely lessened when non-statistically significant effects are 
removed, a testament to the high correlation between the various variables. The marginal effects of a 
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one standard deviation increase in each of the five variables with statistically significant effects is 
presented in Figure 9. 
Figure 9: The marginal effects of standardized psychological traits on favourability towards 
immigration (0-10 scale) with 95% confidence intervals  
 
In the same manner, we now move on to test the effects of various types of socialisation on attitudes to 
migration. We measure the individual’s early life in terms of whether each of their parents has a 
university degree, whether the individual was born in France, and whether they report having had 
financial difficulties when growing up. We measure later ‘cosmopolitan’ socialisation effects by 
whether the individual has a university degree and whether they have worked abroad for more than six 
months in the past ten years. We also include whether the individual is married, whether they have 
children, their age and their household income as a measure of their socio-economic position. The 
correlations of these variables with favourability to immigration, in order of positivity to negativity, 
are presented in Table 3. All, except marriage, are statistically significant. Having a university degree, 
parents having university degrees, household income and having had fewer financial difficulties when 
growing up are all associated with more positive attitudes to immigration. Having children, being born 
in France and being older are all associated with more negative attitudes to immigration. 
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Table 3: Correlations between belief that immigrants make France a better place to live and 
socialisation variables (source: ESS, 2014) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We now produce a multivariate analysis of these socialisation effects, shown in Table 4. The effects of 
one’s mother’s educational background, financial difficulties when growing up, being married, having 
children and having lived abroad all lose their statistical significance when controlling for other 
variables. Most interesting is that the effects of one’s father having a university degree and having a 
university degree are highly similar. This may suggest that these variables pick up the effects of being 
in certain social environments rather than the educational (or ‘indoctrinating’) effects of higher 
education itself. Socialisation effects explain around 8 per cent of variation in attitudes to immigration. 
  
 
Immigrants make France a 
better place to live 
University degree 0.185 
Father university degree 0.141 
Household Income 0.113 
Mother university degree 0.108 
Worked abroad for 6 months in last 10 years 0.07 
Fewer financial difficulties when growing up 0.065 
Married 0.006 
Children -0.106 
Born in France -0.124 
Age -0.192 
Statistically significant correlations in bold (95% level) ; N=1883 
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Table 4: Multivariate analysis of the effects of socialisation on favourability to immigration 
(source: ESS 2014; weighted survey data) 
 
In Figure 10 we present the marginal effects of a one-unit increase in each of the five variables with 
statistically significant effects. The most powerful socialisation predictors are one’s father’s 
educational background, having a university degree and being born in France. Age and household 
income have smaller, though still statistically significant, effects. 
  
 Immigrants make France a worse or 
better place to live 
 (0-10) 
 (1) (2) 
 
Mother university degree -0.079  
 (0.277)  
Father university degree 0.471* 0.478** 
 (0.219) (0.184) 
Born in France -0.960*** -1.106*** 
 (0.237) (0.225) 
Fewer financial difficulties when growing up 0.0411  
 (0.064)  
University degree 0.613*** 0.592*** 
 (0.161) (0.154) 
Married 0.153  
 (0.162)  
Children -0.087  
 (0.179)  
Worked abroad for 6 months in last 10 years 0.171  
 (0.268)  
Age -0.013** -0.016*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) 
Household Income 0.090** 0.095*** 
 (0.032) (0.027) 
Constant 5.388*** 5.826*** 
 (0.404) (0.294) 
   
Observations 1,643 1,778 
R-squared 0.080 0.087 
Standard errors in parentheses ; *** p<0.05, ** p<0.01, * p<0.001 
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Figure 10: The marginal effects of socialisation variables on favourability towards immigration 
(0-10 scale) with 95% confidence intervals  
 
Correlations between political attitudes and attitudes to immigration are presented below, in Table 5. 
These political attitudes measures external political efficacy, trust in politicians, valuing 
egalitarianism, interest in politics, feelings of discrimination, nationalism, authoritarianism, cultural 
supremicism and broader left-right position. All except sense of being discriminated against have 
statistically significant correlations with attitudes to immigration. Individuals who are left wing, 
believe that politicians care what people think, trust politicians, believe in egalitarianism and are 
interested in politics tend to be more pro-immigration. On the other hand, more nationalistic, 
authoritarian, culturally supremacist and right wing individuals tend to be more anti-immigration. 
Table 5: Correlations between belief that immigrants make France a better place to live and 
political attitudes (source: ESS, 2014) 
-2
-1,5
-1
-0,5
0
0,5
1
1,5
Father university
degree
Born in France University degree 10 years older Decile higher
household
income
 
Immigrants make France a 
better place to live 
Politicians care what people think 0.278 
Trust politicians 0.263 
Important that people are treated equally 0.229 
Interested in politics 0.12 
Feel discriminated against -0.022 
Feel close to France -0.106 
Want a strong government that ensures safety -0.202 
Some cultures are better than others -0.205 
Left-right scale (0 left – 10 right) -0.288 
Statistically significant correlations in bold (95% level) ; N=1883 
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In Table 6, we test the effects of variables with statistically significant effects above in a multivariate 
analysis. All retain their statistical significance and direction of effect. These political attitudes explain 
around a quarter of variation in attitudes to immigration. Variance Inflation Factors are presented in 
Appendix 2. 
Table 6: Multivariate analysis of the effects of political attitudes on favourability to immigration 
(source: ESS 2014; weighted survey data) 
The marginal effects of these variables, all standardised, are presented in Figure 11. Broad left-right 
self-placement has the largest effect on attitudes to immigration in France. In terms of specific 
attitudes, egalitarianism is most strongly associated with pro-immigration sentiment and desire for 
strong government that ensures safety is most strongly associated with anti-immigration sentiment. 
  
 (1) 
  
Politicians care what people think 0.151*** 
 (0.0418) 
Trust politicians 0.172*** 
 (0.0469) 
Important that people are treated equally 0.398*** 
 (0.0660) 
Interested in politics 0.264*** 
 (0.0650) 
Feel close to France -0.218* 
 (0.0970) 
Want a strong government that ensures safety -0.210*** 
 (0.0481) 
Some cultures are better than others -0.466*** 
 (0.143) 
Left-right scale (0 left – 10 right) -0.188*** 
 (0.0266) 
Constant 5.493*** 
 (0.347) 
  
Observations 1,720 
R-squared 0.250 
Standard errors in parentheses ; *** p<0.05, ** p<0.01, * p<0.001 
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Figure 11: The marginal effects of political attitudes on favourability towards immigration (0-10 
scale) with 95% confidence intervals  
 
At the most proximal end of the funnel of causality are variables that measure individual perceptions 
and experiences of immigration and immigrants. The more vulnerable one feels, in terms of safety, in 
their neighbourhood and the higher their estimate of the proportion of immigrants in France, the more 
anti-immigration they are. Inversely, the actual percentage of foreign-born residents in one’s region 
(NUTS-2) and having friends who are of a different race or ethnicity are associated with more positive 
sentiment towards immigration.  
Table 7: Correlations between belief that immigrants make France a better place to live and 
contextual variables (source: ESS, 2014) 
 
Immigrants make France a 
better place to live 
Feel unsafe walking alone after dark -0.271 
Guess of number of people of minority ethnicity in current 
area 0.082 
Guess of % of foreign born in country -0.183 
Actual regional foreign born % 0.078 
Have friends of different race or ethnicity 0.277 
Statistically significant correlations in bold (95% level) ; N=1883 
These variables are all included in a multivariate analysis, the results of which are presented in Table 
8. The effects of all retain their statistical significance; while the effect of one’s estimation of the 
number of ethnic minority individuals in their neighbourhood retains its statistical insignificance. 
Together, these variables account for over 16 per cent of the variation in attitudes to immigration. 
Variance Inflation Factors for Model 2 are presented in Appendix 3. 
-0,8
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Table 8: Multivariate analysis of the effects of contextual variables on favourability to 
immigration (source: ESS 2014; weighted survey data) 
 
As shown in Figure 12, the most powerful marginal effects of these contextual variables are the actual 
proportion of foreign born residents in one’s region and having friends of a different race or ethnicity, 
both of which are associated with more positive views of immigration.  
  
 Immigrants make France a better place 
to live 
 (1) (2) 
   
Feel unsafe walking alone after dark -0.564*** -0.544*** 
 (0.075) (0.075) 
Guess of number of people of minority ethnicity 
in current area 
0.183  
 (0.095)  
Guess of % of foreign born in country -0.011*** -0.010*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
Actual regional foreign born % 4.875*** 5.337*** 
 (1.338) (1.284) 
Have friends of different race or ethnicity 1.145*** 1.208*** 
 (0.137) (0.134) 
Constant 4.704*** 4.938*** 
 (0.254) (0.234) 
   
Observations 1,719 1,727 
R-squared 0.164 0.162 
Standard errors in parentheses ; *** p<0.05, ** p<0.01, * p<0.001 
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Figure 12: The marginal effects of contextual variables on favourability towards immigration (0-
10 scale) with 95% confidence intervals  
 
Finally, we produce a multivariate analysis that tests the effects of all of the variables from the four 
theoretical groupings that had statistically significant effects in their final models. This analysis is 
presented in Table 9. The final model shows those variables that have direct, statistically significant 
effects on attitudes to immigration. 
Table 9: Combined multivariate analysis of favourability to immigration (source: ESS 2014; 
weighted survey data) 
 (1) (2) 
   
Important to understand different people 0.263*** 0.258*** 
 (0.066) (0.067) 
Important to seek adventure and have an exciting life 0.007  
 (0.064)  
To do what is told and follow rules 0.123  
 (0.067)  
To behave properly -0.146* -0.178** 
 (0.064) (0.062) 
To live in secure and safe surroundings -0.145* -0.181** 
 (0.064) (0.061) 
Father university degree 0.062  
 (0.186)  
Born in France -0.501** -0.511* 
 (0.212) (0.212) 
University degree 0.0569  
 (0.141)  
Age -0.007 -0.009** 
 (0.004) (0.003) 
Household income 0.052* 0.056* 
-1
-0,5
0
0,5
1
1,5
2
Feel unsafe walking
alone after dark
10% higher guess of
foreign born in
country
10% higher actual
regional foreign born
%
Have friends of
different race or
ethnicity
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 (0.024) (0.023) 
Politicians care what people think 0.154  
 (0.079)  
Trust politicians 0.404*** 0.505*** 
 (0.088) (0.066) 
Important that people are treated equally 0.345*** 0.356*** 
 (0.065) (0.066) 
Interested in politics -0.037  
 (0.062)  
Feel close to France 0.054  
 (0.060)  
Want a strong government that ensures safety -0.145* -0.148* 
 (0.067) (0.067) 
Some cultures are better than others -0.114  
 (0.06)  
Left-right scale (0 left – 10 right) -0.417*** -0.433*** 
 (0.062) (0.062) 
Feel unsafe walking alone after dark -0.268*** -0.292*** 
 (0.076) (0.077) 
Guess of number of people of minority ethnicity in current 
area 
-0.007 -0.008* 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
Actual regional foreign born % 3.235** 3.281** 
 (1.271) (1.222) 
Have friends of different ethnicity 0.657*** 0.703*** 
 (0.135) (0.134) 
Constant 5.274*** 5.427*** 
 (0.362) (0.360) 
   
Observations 1,508 1,551 
R-squared 0.375 0.361 
Standard errors in parentheses ; *** p<0.05, ** p<0.01, * p<0.001 
Trust in politicians, being left-wing, strong egalitarianism, having friends of a different race or 
ethnicity, valuing diversity, living in a more diverse area and being more well-off financially are all 
associated with more pro-immigration attitudes, in descending order of magnitude. On the other hand, 
being born in France, being more right-wing, feeling unsafe in one’s neighbourhood, valuing security, 
adhering to societal norms, perceiving immigration rates as higher, wanting a stronger government to 
ensure safety and being older are all associated with more negative attitudes. Interestingly, having a 
university degree, interest in politics, nationalism and cultural supremicism do not have direct effects 
on attitudes to immigration. Overall, the 14 direct, statistically significant effects predict nearly 40 per 
cent of variation in attitudes to immigration. Their marginal effects are presented in Figure 13. 
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Figure 13: The marginal effects of combined variables on favourability towards immigration in 
France (0-10 scale) with 95% confidence intervals  
 
Conclusion 
We find in this paper that, perhaps contrary to media reports and common perception, attitudes to 
immigration in France are both stable and reflect deeply-formed psychological and value-based 
cleavages amongst individuals. In terms of opposition to immigration, France stands in middle of 
Europe, relatively more opposed than other western European states, such as Germany, but still 
considerably more positive than eastern European states. Given the cross-time stability in this position, 
it seems relatively unlikely to change and there is no evidence of a ‘wave’ of anti-immigration 
sentiment or any form of backlash against recent immigration rates. Most surprising is that the French 
are considerably less concerned by immigration, in terms of the issues that they perceive as important 
to their country, than other western European countries, particularly compared to the United Kingdom, 
Denmark or, lately, even Germany. The recent uptick in the importance of the immigration debate is 
far less pronounced in France than in any other western European country. Where France does stand 
out is in its concern over the cultural assimilation of immigrants and its relative lack of concern over 
their economic assimilation, reflecting and causing France’s history and its on-going political 
discourse. 
The divide between those who hold favourable and unfavourable views to immigration is rooted in 
deep psychological differences and is relatively immune towards later life socialisation effects, even 
including university education. Instead, we see that having an open and excitable personality leads to 
support for immigration, whereas having a conscientious and assurance-seeking personality leads to 
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greater scepticism over the effects of immigration. These personality types also lead to attitudes such 
as support for egalitarianism and strong government, which respectively lead to pro- and anti-
immigration positions. The immigration cleavage is also clearly a result of broader ideological 
placement on the left-right spectrum. Furthermore, individuals who are trusting of politicians’ motives 
tend to be more supportive of immigration whereas those who are more sceptical of politicians are also 
more sceptical of the effects of immigration. With these variables, as well as youth, income, having 
ethnically diverse friends and living in a diverse area (all of which increase favourability to 
immigration) we are able to explain around 40 per cent of variation in attitudes to immigration in 
France. Most surprisingly, we find no direct effects of university education, parental education (as a 
proxy for background), nationalist and supremacist attitudes, interest in politics and having lived 
abroad on attitudes to immigration. This suggests that, once attitudinal predispositions are formed very 
early – or even immediately - in life, they are relatively immune from contextual changes and are 
unlikely to be altered through exposure to new information.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Variance Inflation Factors of Model 1 in Table 2 
 
To understand different people 1.50 
To seek adventure and have an exciting life 1.44 
To seek fun and things that give pleasure 1.43 
To try new and different things in life 1.42 
To think new ideas and be creative 1.36 
To have a good time 1.28 
To be humble and modest, not draw attention 1.25 
To get respect from others 1.21 
To follow tradition and customs 1.20 
To do what is told and follow rules 1.19 
To behave properly 1.16 
To live in secure and safe surroundings 1.15 
Mean VIF 1.30 
Appendix 2: Variance Inflation Factors of Model 1 in Table 6 
 
Politicians care what people think 1.70 
Trust politicians 1.69 
Important that people are treated equally 1.10 
Interested in politics 1.07 
Feel close to France 1.08 
Want a strong government that ensures safety 1.12 
Some cultures are better than others 1.05 
Left-right scale (0 left – 10 right) 1.14 
Mean VIF 1.24 
Appendix 3: Variance Inflation Factors of Model 1 in Table 8 
 
Feel unsafe walking alone after dark 1.12 
Guess of number of people of minority ethnicity in 
current area 1.14 
Guess of % of foreign born in country 1.06 
Actual regional foreign born % 1.06 
Have friends of different race or ethnicity 1.08 
Mean VIF 1.24 
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